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For several years past the international monetary system has not 
~een wo~king in a manner that we could consider to be satisfactrrcry. 
To meet the difficulties that keep on occurring in this field important 
and ofteri' improvised cha:n.ges have been made in, the rules that were 
wQrk~d-out immediately after the war. 
~his has produced considerable disorder, and as there has :hbt 
b'eeh' ·sufficiently broad agreement as to the proper remedies, the dis-
ord~r has not yet been put right. The free world cannot be sati~­
fied With an attempt to solve the problem .of the imbalances whiph 
f~ce.it today by applying methods which recall the disastrous errors 
of the period between the two great wars. 
A number of important declarations have now changed the ter~s 
in which the problem is posed - i:he statement by the President o'f the 
French Republic on 4 February, President Johnson 1 s message t.o the 
Congress on the United States balance of 'payments, ~ade on 10 Fe.brv.ary, 
the lecture given on 11 February by M·. Giscard d 1Estaing,. the French 
Minister of Finance and Economic Affairs, the further.remarks py the 
United States,President on lC February, and yet others. ' 
Commentators have frequently tried to oppose these various po'ints 
of view. In an endeavour to be constructive and to help work out·a· 
solution that could be acceptable to everyone, I propose to 'begin by 
~nda~lining what is common ground and then to show what questions still 
re~ain .to be answered and in what direction we could usefully seek 
' the answers. , · · 
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Let me say first of all that discussions on the world monetary 
system would not be taking p~ace in such a strained atmosphere if the 
balance of p.sLyments of the United States, the greRtest economic power: 
in the western world, had not been showing a serious d'efidi t for 
more than seven years. This chronic deficit was made possible, if not 
caused, by an excess of domestic liquidity in America itself. It has 
been a not inconsiderable factor of inflation for the chief trading 
partners of the United States, though- at least in the EEC -piTely 
internal factors ha·.~e played an even more important part. Some central 
banks have accumulc_. ted dollars. in considera.ble quanti ties; this 
enabled the United States to be in deficit over a long period without 
its gold reserves ha.ving to suffer the full consequences. 
Such are, broadly, the facts. 
President Johnson has made a lucid and courageous analysis of 
this situation. He has given us the striking phraseg "Je are highly 
solvent, but not liquid enough". He has also saidi "vle cannot, and 
do not, assume that the world's willingness to hold dollars is 
unlimi ted 11 • He has restated the f'irm determination of the United 
States to elimina.te the deficit on its balance of payments. 
\ 
There is much discussi,on on the causes of this deficit~ we may 
hope that the controversy will be ended by what the Americans them-
, selves say. "Our payments problem", President Johnson has stated, 
"is not an export problem.... ·vve ,have 1;o deal head-on with the surg-
ing outflow of private capital". 
We.are all aware of the measures t~at ~he President of the 
United States has decided to impose, I shall not go into them here. 
However, in a speech to American bankers and businessmen, the 
President did say: "But you and I know that this won't be enough. 
Capital will still flow a0road to the advanced countries from your 
banks and your businesses if you let it". 
Leading bankers ana businessmen have therefore been asked to 
co-operate with the Administration in a campai@l to restrict short-: 
term loans and direct long-term investment abroad. 
vmat is there for us to say at this stage about American policy, 
which is not just a domestic affair for the United States but is 
also of major concern to the Community and. the· rest of. the world? 
First, w~ can say that things are moving·in the right direction. 
I do not wish to prejudge the matter, but I would simply say we 
trust and believe that United States policy will lead to a substantial 
and lasting reduction in the deficit if certain internal measures 
are taken at the same time. 
':fe can but endorse without reservation what the EEC Monetary 
Committee said in its latest report, from which I will quote briefly: 
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"There is therefore no doubt that capital transactions are 
the item which calls for attention if the American deficit is to be 
corrected. It is he.rd to see how this can be done as long as the 
American capital mo.rkets enjoy their :present am:ple su:p:plies of funds". 
~ie agree with the Monetary Committee in thinking that a 
tightening of the American financial markets, one result of which 
would be to raise long-term interest rates, is among the conditions 
without which-it will not be :possible to re-establish equilibrium 
on a lasting basis. 
Ve think, that slowing down American direct investment in the 
industrially developed countries would also contribute to the general 
health of our economies. It.would be useful if the Community 
countries add:pte~ a common attitude to these transactions. There is 
no question - I wish to make this clear to avoid any misunderstanding -
of closing Europe to such investment, which ts more often than not 
highly beneficial to our countries, but simply of avoiding excess. 
Community action in this direction could consist of a detailed 
statistical check on direct investments fron non-member countries, 
supplemented by machinery for consultation between the Governments 
and the Commission on national :policies in this sphere. This :pre-
su:ppeses, of course, that all Member States su:p:ply each other 
with the necessary information. In this way we should be moving 
in the direction a:ready required under Article 72 of the Treaty 
of Rome. 
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This brings me to the queEtion of the international monetary 
system, which is today the subject of lively debate. 'le believe 
that such discussion is, in :part, the result of certain mis-
understandin.~s, and these must first be dispelled. 
The expression "gold standard" has been used in several · 
different senses, between which it is essential to distinguish. 
Certain :persons, who in any case do not occupy :positions of 
responsibility in the conduct of :public affairs, consider that it 
means a :pure and simple return to the monetary machinery that 
existed befMe the First ''forld '/Tar, which was characterized by the 
almost exclusive use of gold in international payments with, as 
a result, serious and rapid deflation in a debbor country whichdid 
not :possess large reserves. 'rhis is a system which we rule· out. 
For others the gold standard, which could also be called 
the reformed gold exchange standard, means a return to a stricter 
monetary system and to the. -ideas which underlay the Bretton Woods 
agreements made during the Second World 'far .• 
These ideas affirm the :primacy of gold in the final financing 
of balance-of-payments imbalancBs, but accept the maintaining, and 
:perhaps even the widening, of international credit facilities, 
:provid4id these facilities do not in :practice remove all need for 
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the debtor country to take the necessary steps to ensure the speediest 
possible return to equilibrium. This would mean maintaining the 
machinery of monetary co-operation represented by the IMF, the 
Group of Ten,. and the short-term credits which central banks make 
available to each other. 
These ideas do not, however, allow of'tha future accumulation 
by the central banks of large surpluses in foreign currency. 
The EEC Commission is inclined to share these ideas. 
The weaknesses of the gold exchange standard, as applied at present, 
are now universally recognized, and it appears that the arbitrary 
creation of international liquidity, not in accordance with the 
needs of international trade but following disequilibrium in the 
balance of payments of this or that country, has now reached a limit 
which it would be dangerous to exceed. 
Even if a general agreement could be reached on such a basis, 
two further questions would arise on which, with your permission, 
I should rather not give you answers today, though I can make a few 
introductory points: 
1. 
2. 
Vfuat should be the fate of balances at present held in foreign 
Qurrencies by the central banks ? No sudden decision should be 
taken. The solution should be sought without haste, in view of 
the debtor and creditor countries' need for security and in 
order to avoid causing a conside'rable contraction in the volume 
of international liquidity. 
\{.hat would in future be the means used to crente the additional 
international liquidity that will be necessary by the expansion 
and we hope it will be rapid - of trade of every kind between 
the countries of the free world if, as is probalie, the product-
ion of gold should prove insufficient ? \'le do not think there_ 
should be an increase in the price of gOtl, since this might 
undermine confidence in national currencies. The creation of 
additional intern~tional liquidity should be done on the 
basis of agreed criteric. and amounts, so as to exclude the 
maintenance over lengthy periods of disequilibria in the balance 
of payments, except in the case of developing countries, which 
could cover their deficits by means of long-term capital imports. 
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I should be disappointing you if I did not say a few words on the 
role that tne Community can and must play in solving the problems I 
have been speaking about. Its role is already a considerable one. 
I refer again to our Monetary Committee's recent report. 
It states that "at the end of 1964, outstanding drawings on 
the IMF totalled $ 2 622 million. Of this total, $ 857 million was 
financed by IMF sales of gold, while of the balance of $ 1765 million, 
$ 1 437 million - more than 80% - was in the form of drawings on 
Community currencies." 
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The Community's opportunity for action at world level would be 
cons}~erably enlarged if its own monetary unity were reinforced. 
This-'%lready a reality, but it may still be called in question again. 
I quote the }lfonetary Committee once more: 
11 It (the Monetary Committee) concludes that progressive 
integration within the EEC 1 and particularly the tendency for the 
respective prices of a growing number of produc is to settle .at 
much the same level throughout the C~mmunity, will make a devaluation 
or revaluation increasingly difficult and unlikely. The establish-
ment of a single agricultural market Will strenghton this trend. 
However, the Committee considers that even so it would still be 
possible for a State to adjust the exchange rate of its currency, 
should this prove necessary in order to safeguard, for example, the 
smooth working of the Common Market itself". 
This description of the present situation corresponds to the 
facts. Our task is now to ensure that devaluation or revaluation, 
which today are only difficult and unlikely, becomes impossible and 
useless. 
The Executive Commisslon is already at work on this. It is 
seeking a solution along seve~al lines at the same time, realizing 
that in each of them decisions will have to be taken which together 
will form an indivisible whole. At this stage I shall do no more 
than indicate the lines we are following: 
1. We n.re seeking, on the basis of methods already used last year 
to deal wlth economic inbalances, to intensify co-o~dination 
of the economic and fin~ncial policies pursued in the Member 
States by endeavouring to work out common norms 'for such matters 
as budgetary policy, credit policy and, as soon as possible, 
incomes policy. 
2. We are seeking t9 achieve complete unity as·· regards capital 
movements, whether for long-term or shcrt~term invest~ent. 
3. We aim at harmonizing progressively the instruments of monetary 
policy. 
4. We are seeking to strengthen the solidarity of Member States 
in the matter of international liquidity reserves and their 
co-operation in international monetary operations, until the 
day when the reserves of each c9un'try can be·cdnsidered as 
part of a single reserve. 
The movement towards monetary, union is essential for the 
Community nself, and also for tpe future of the international monetary 
system, f9r if monetary cohesion reaches the point where the Common 
Market is looked upon from· the. outside as a single unit, the search 
for international equilibrium will be simplified by a reduction in 
the number of decision-taking centres and by the opportunities stem--
mng from partnership among equals. 
Later I propose to make a statement to the Parliament on the 
acti~n. programme,the Commission is to adopt in crder to achieve the 
aims I have just summarized. 
